An e-retailing supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracies by Rekik, Yacine et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/73485/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Rekik, Yacine, Syntetos, Argyrios and Jemai, Zied 2015. An e-retailing supply chain subject to
inventory inaccuracies. International Journal of Production Economics 167 , pp. 139-155.
10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.011 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.011
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.011>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
An e-Retailing Supply Chain Subject to Inventory
Inaccuracies1
Yacine Rekika, Aris Syntetosb, Zied Jemaic
aEMLYON Business School, DISP, 23 av. Guy de Collongue, 69134 Ecully, France
bCardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK
cEcole Centrale Paris, Laboratoire Ge´nie Industriel, Grande Voie des Vignes 92295
Chatenay Malabry, France
Abstract
One of the implicit assumptions considered in the majority of investigations
performed in the area of inventory management is that the physical flow of
products in an inventory system is free from defects. The same is hypothe-
sized for the associated information flow. However, various factors may create
a difference between the actual physical and information system (IS) flows and
perturb their synchronized evolution. The implications of such a discrepancy
are particularly prevalent in contemporary supply chains, where sales commit-
ments are based on IS records only. In this paper we model and analyze the
impact of inventory inaccuracies on supply chain performance. We first provide
an overview of potential errors that may occur within an inventory system and
we then propose a general framework to model the impact of inaccuracy errors.
Potential errors in both the physical and/or the IS record inventories are con-
sidered and optimal analytical solutions are provided for both centralized and
decentralized (coordinated and uncoordinated) supply chains for three plausible
scenarios: inaccuracy errors are ignored; errors are estimated; the utilization of
a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology enables the reduction of
the relevant errors. The performance improvements enabled by the availability
of error related information and the RFID technology are assessed and man-
agerial insights are provided. The paper concludes with the implications of our
work for supply chain design as well as with an agenda for further research in
this area.
Keywords: inventory inaccuracies, supply chain management, RFID
technology, newsvendor problem, internet ordering, random yield.
1All the Appendices to this paper are separately presented as supplementary material in
an Electronic Companion.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The inventory Inaccuracy Issue
One of the implicit assumptions considered in the majority of investigations
performed in the area of inventory management is that the physical flow of
products in an inventory system is free from defects. The same is commonly
hypothesized for the associated information flow resulting in an expected match
between physical and information system (IS) inventories. However, there is a
plethora of factors that may generate a deviation between the inventory level
displayed in the information system (i.e., what is available according to the IS)
and the physical inventory (i.e. what is actually available). Such deviations are
referred to as inventory inaccuracies and may deeply affect the operational and
financial performance of firms (Schrady (1970)). Atali et al. (2009) discussed
three different kinds of streams that may result in inventory inaccuracies. First,
some streams result in permanent inventory shrinkage (such as theft and
damage). Some others may result in temporary discrepancies and stock
may be recovered by physical inventory audits and returned to the stock-base
(such as misplacements). The final group of the relevant streams affects only
the inventory records and leaves the physical inventory unchanged (an example
relates to the consequences of scanning errors). Transaction errors are unin-
tentional errors occurring during inventory transactions. Such errors arise while
counting the inventory, receiving an order or checking out at the cash register.
Iglehart and Morey (1972) proposed an analytical tool to aid the task of con-
trolling inventory errors; the objective of this study was to select the type and
frequency of counts and to modify the predetermined inventory policy by adding
a buffer that compensates for errors so as to minimize the total cost (inventory
holding + inspection costs) per unit time. Sandoh and Shimamoto (2001) also
built a model that determines the optimal frequency of periodic reviews within
a supermarket, resulting from the trade off between the cost related to such
counting exercises and the cost of investigating the causes of inventory devia-
tions. More recently, the work conducted by Ko¨k and Shang (2007) aimed at
finding effective inventory replenishment and inspection policies that minimize
inventory and inspection costs over a finite horizon. Record inaccuracies could
also be the consequence of having an unreliable supply system. In fact, when
the production process has a low yield or the supply process is unreliable, the
physical available inventory may not be known until an inspection is performed
and as a consequence it may be different from the inventory in the information
system (Yano and Lee (1995), Inderfurth (2004), Kang and Gershwin (2005)
and Rekik et al. (2007b)).
1.2 The Internet Retailing Context
From the above discussion it is evident that the very source of an inaccuracy may
be either an error related to the physical inventory and/or one that affects the
IS records only. In addition to the errors sources discussed above, the internet
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retailing context may also suffer from the existence of two databases: one associ-
ated with the e-retail website and another with the ERP system: a bad synchro-
nization between the two databases constitute an additional source of inventory
inaccuracy. Errors will always raise significant problems in traditional/in-store
retail supply chains but their implications may become even more evident in
electronic/internet retailing supply chains. In the later case not only ordering
but also sales decisions are being taken based solely on the inventory level dis-
played in the IS. As such, a sales commitment may be made for example but
not be respected when delivering the products (if the physical inventory level
is lower than that indicated in the information system). In fact, under an elec-
tronic context, final customers make their order in front of a screen or by phone.
Demand satisfaction is achieved based on the inventory levels in the Information
System (and not based on the physical available stock) unlike the in-store case.
To the best of our knowledge, all inventory management investigations (ex-
cept the ones conducted by Sahin and Dallery (2009) and Rekik (2011) which
are discussed later on our paper) where the inventory system is subject to in-
accuracies, have been performed in the context of a ’traditional’ retail channel.
Although we have used the e-Retailing case to illustrate the context of our in-
ventory framework, it is clear that any other upstream supply chain actor (such
as a wholesaler, distributor etc) is relying solely upon the IS records in order to
satisfy demand. We will continue to be referring to the e-Retailing case for the
purpose of our analysis but the reader should bear in mind that all our findings
apply equally to any other upstream supply chain stage.
Despite the abundance of empirical evidence on the importance of the inven-
tory inaccuracy issue in traditional/in-store retail supply chains (Raman et al.
(2001)), no evidence has been put forward on the significance of this issue
in internet businesses. The impact of inaccuracies in such a context may be
studied thanks to ’review and opinion’ websites which reflect the experience of
e-customers with e-Retailers. Examples of such customers’ feedback are avail-
able on platforms such as www.complaints.com, www.pissedconsumer.com or
www.e-customer-satisfaction.com. To assess the presence of the inaccuracy is-
sue among the e-customers’ complaints, we have conducted a search with the
keyword ’stock’ or ’inventory’ on these platforms resulting in a very great num-
ber of testimonies describing exactly the e-Retailing inaccuracy issue studied in
our paper.
1.3 The RFID Technology
Dealing with inventory inaccuracy issues is not a straightforward exercise.
Companies may of course just ignore the presence of such errors continuing their
operations as if no errors have occurred. Alternatively, and should some infor-
mation be available on the behavior of these errors, companies may attempt to
estimate them for the purpose of improving their performance. Finally, vari-
ous papers have studied the benefits of tackling the inventory inaccuracy issue
through the adoption of the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology.
RFID technologies offer several contributions to supply chain through their ad-
vanced properties such as unique identification of products, easiness of commu-
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nication and real-time information (Michael and McCathie (2005), Saygin et al.
(2007), Hozak and Collier (2008), Heim et al. (2009)). RFID can improve the
traceability of products and the visibility throughout the entire supply chain,
and may also render more reliable various operational processes such as tracking,
shipping, checkout and counting, which lead to improved inventory flows and
more accurate information (Chow et al. (2006), Tajima (2007), Bendoly et al.
(2007), (Ti-Jun et al., 2014), (Piramuthu et al., 2014)). Miragliotta et al. (2009)
provided an in-depth literature review and a classification of the main implica-
tions related to RFID applications. Most of the research/case study work in
this area considers the evaluation of the hard (direct) benefits of RFID like its
impact on inbound and outbound logistics (see, for example, Atkinson (2005),
Vijayaraman and Osyk (2006), Altay and Taylor (2007), Gaukler and Hausman
(2008) and Giusto et al. (2010)). Some investigations provide a compatative
study between the barcode and the RFID identification technologies ((Chan
et al., 2012)). The contribution of RFID in other areas, such as the reduction
of the Bullwhip Effect and the more ’robust’ application of inventory replenish-
ment policies is also increasingly being recognised and evaluated (Sarac et al.
(2010)). Similarly, several authors have been interested in RFID technologies
to reduce the effects of inventory inaccuracy errors. Some of these studies will
be discussed in the next section but the interested readers are referred to Lee
and Ozer (2007) for a comprehensive review on that issue.
1.4 Contribution and Organization of the paper
The aim of our paper is to model and study in detail the implications of the
presence of inventory inaccuracies in a supply chain. We do so by introducing
an e-Retailing based modeling framework, a special case of which is the tradi-
tional in-store retail supply chain. We consider the possibility of errors being
present in both the physical and/or the IS inventory levels and we focus on both
centralized and decentralized (coordinated and uncoordinated) supply chains.
For each scenario we assess: i) the impact of the errors being ignored; ii) the
benefit of deploying better inventory strategies taking into account the error
estimation; iii) the impact of the RFID technology to cope with inaccuracies.
Such contributions constitute collectively a considerable extension of the current
state of knowledge in this area. In particular, there have been only two studies
concerned with inventory inaccuracies in an electronic context. In the first one
developed by Sahin and Dallery (2009), a centralized supply chain was assumed
coupled with the assumption that the physical inventory levels are free from
defects. The second study developed by Rekik (2011) extended the framework
provided by Sahin and Dallery (2009) by including the errors on the IS level
but was only concerned with the case of a centralized supply chain.
Under the decentralized supply chain configuration, all previous work dealing
with the inventory inaccuracy issue (Gaukler et al. (2007); Heese (2007); Rekik
et al. (2007a); C¸amdereli and Swaminathan (2009)) study the retail supply chain
structure where the inventory level shown in the IS system does not play any
role in satisfying the customers’ demand. In these investigations, the inaccuracy
issue is only impacting the physical inventory.
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In addition to the above issues, and given the increased rates of using RFID
it is natural to consider it as a possibility towards the resolution of inaccuracy
related issues. The linkage between RFID and inventory accuracy is an area
that may certainly benefit from further investigations and for this particular
case we derive the conditions under which such a technology is cost effective
and we evaluate the way its cost may be shared between supply chain actors.
The remainder of our paper is organized in three main parts as follows: the first
part (Section 2) describes and formulates mathematically the framework under
study. The second part of the paper aims to provide the optimal strategies for
three supply chain scenarios: a centralized one (Section 3.1); a decentralized
uncoordinated one (Section 3.2) and a decentralized coordinated supply chain
(Section 3.3). For each supply chain structure, the inventory optimization con-
tribution concerns three possible approaches: the first one considers the case of
inaccuracy errors being estimated (and the relevant information being of course
utilized for more effective inventory management decision making (Approach
1)); the second deals with the case according to which errors are being ignored
(Approach 2); the last one examines the inventory implications of using the
RFID approach (Approach 3). In the third and last part of the paper, we first
provide managerial insights in Section 4. We do so by contrasting Approaches
1 and 2 & 1 and 3 for all three supply chain structures considered in our paper.
The former comparison enables insights to be gained into the benefits of infor-
mation on errors; the later highlights the implications of the RFID deployment.
Our paper ends with the concluding remarks of our work along with the natural
next steps of research in this area (Section 5).
2. The Framework under study
2.1 The Problem Setting
For the remainder of our paper, we consider the supply chain of an internet
retailing channel. This supply chain is composed of two actors, the e-Retailer
and the manufacturer managing a single seasonal product characterized by a
unique selling season (newsvendor).We consider the following sequence of events:
Let Q be the quantity that the e-Retailer orders from the manufacturer. When
the necessary quantity has been produced, the manufacturer will deliver it to
the e-Retailer. The e-Retailer will receive goods, update the information system
by scanning products and store them in the warehouse. Because of errors, QPH ,
i.e. what is physically available in inventory for a product at the beginning of
the selling period, may not be equal to QIS , i.e. what the information system
shows as being available. Just before the beginning of the selling period, the e-
Retailer will receive a cumulative online order from the final customers. He will
compare the total quantity requested by the customers with the IS inventory
record to accept or decline orders. If the cumulative order is less than QIS , the
e-Retailer will accept all the orders. If not, he will only accept orders summing
up to the IS inventory. Later on, products will be shipped from the e-Retailer’s
warehouse and delivered to the customers. All the orders that the e-Retailer has
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committed himself to should in principle be satisfied. However, this may not
always be the case due to inventory inaccuracies when the commitment quantity
is higher than QPH . Based on the sequence of events described above, one could
consider three penalties that should be taken into account when deciding the
quantity to order:
• An overage penalty which is paid by the e-Retailer when a product remains
in its warehouse at the end of the selling season.
• A first (type 1) underage penalty which is incurred when, based on the IS
system, the e-Retailer is not able to satisfy a customer demand.
• A second (type 2) underage penalty which is incurred when the e-Retailer
is not able to respect his commitment.
The problem formulation discussed above implies a single lump-sum ar-
rival of demand (i.e. a cumulative demand) which is representative of many
e-Retailing settings procceding with an aggreagate and a collective end-of-period
shipping.
2.2 Approaches to Inventory Management Subject to Inaccuracy Problems
First, let us define the role of the RFID technology in such inventory systems
where a non-agreement may exist between the ordered quantity, the PH and the
IS inventories. The RFID technology may be linked to the inventory inaccuracy
issue in the following important ways: i) The RFID may prevent or reduce the
magnitude of some sources of inventory inaccuracy; ii) When errors are not
reduced or eliminated, the visibility provided by this technology permits the
alignment between the IS and the physical inventory levels.
In the case where the RFID technology is not deployed, one should distinguish
between two situations depending on whether the e-Retailer is aware or not
of the existence of errors. The case where the inventory manager is aware of
errors occurring in the inventory system will be referred to as Approach 1.
With regards to Approach 1, the average and the standard deviation of the
errors are known thanks to statistical studies that the inventory manager may
perform. In fact being aware that errors are occurring, he could perform periodic
inspections to estimate and to improve his knowledge about the errors occurring
in the warehouse. The publication of Pergamalis (2002) provides an excellent
methodology permitting to measure the inaccuracy parameters. Another way
to estimate errors is through the use of a Bayesian updating mechanism as
illustrated in the investigation of DeHoratius et al. (2008). The case where the
inventory manager is unaware or simply ignores errors will be referred to as
Approach 2
In this paper, the scenario in which RFID is deployed will be referred to as
Approach 3. Under Approach 3, we assume that the costs associated with the
implementation of this technology consists of the RFID tags attached to each
item individually, at a certain price t per unit. The fixed costs of the investment
necessary to implement the technology are deliberately not part of our inventory
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models. Such fixed costs may be included by a Return On Investment or a
Net Present Value analysis. Under Approach 3, we assume that the RFID
technology provides visibility to the inventory manager, i.e. permits to align
the IS and the PH levels without having a preventive impact on errors. The
case where the RFID technology prevents or eliminates the errors is indirectly
studied in this paper since Approach 1 with lower errors’ characteristics (average
and variability) could model the RFID enabled approach where the technology
decreases errors without eliminating them.
In contrast to Approach 1, Approaches 2 and 3 are easier to model and optimize.
In fact, in Approach 2, the inventory manager acts as if there were no errors
so, his replenishment policy coincides simply with the error free replenishment
policy, i.e. the optimal newsvendor policy. Approach 3 is also a basic inventory
problem with modified cost parameters where the RFID tag cost is included.
Due to constraints related to the length of the manuscript, in the next section
we focus on the analysis associated with Approach 1. The optimal inventory
policies pertaining to Approaches 2 & 3, which are adapted from the classical
inventory literature, are provided in the Electronic Companion of this paper.
Three scenarios are considered for the above discussed analysis:
1. The Centralized scenario (C) where we assume that there is a single
decision-maker who is concerned with maximizing the entire chain’s profit;
2. The Decentralized Uncoordinated scenario (DU) where we consider
two decision-makers, the manufacturer and the e-Retailer, and each opti-
mizes his own expected profit function;
3. The Decentralized Coordinated scenario (DC) where the manufac-
turer and the e-Retailer cooperate in order to render the total expected
profit closer to the expected profit associated with the Centralized sce-
nario.
2.3 Modeling of Errors and Notations
In a general setting the IS inventory, QIS (PH inventory, QPH) can be
expressed as a function of the ordered quantity Q and either an additive, eIS
(ePH) or multiplicative, γIS (γPH) random variable characterizing errors. The
two cases are outlined below:
• The additive case: QIS and QPH are respectively given by QIS = Q+eIS
and QPH = Q+ ePH
• The multiplicative case: QIS and QPH are respectively given by QIS =
γISQ and QPH = γPHQ
In the first case, errors are independent of the ordered quantity. For example,
they may arise as an outcome of administrative malfunctions (a wrong recording
for instance of 7 units rather than 9 in the ordering process). In this case, the
error realization does not depend on the ordered quantity. In the multiplicative
case, the error realization depends on the ordered quantity. Factors such as theft
can probably be modelled in this way since the higher the ordered quantity
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is, the higher will be the quantity potentially stolen. In contrast, it would
be reasonable to assume that errors made by human beings, like transaction
errors, may be represented by an additive structure. Similarly, misplacement
errors made within the store or the storage warehouse can also be modelled by
the additive setting. The probability that a customer takes a product, tries it,
decides not to buy it and then places it in the wrong shelf is independent of
the quantity or the batch initially available in the right shelf. The error setting
considered in this paper is the additive one (assuming independence between
eIS and ePH). Our choice is motivated by the following arguments:
• As mentioned above, the additive setting is representative of many sources
of inventory inaccuracies particularly the transaction errors which impact
exclusively the IS stock.
• From an empirical and practical point of view, the multiplicative link
between errors and the actual stock level is not easy to show and validate.
This is particularly true when errors accumulate over periods and are only
discovered when an inspection is being made: it is not straightforward to
link the gap between the IS and the PH stock levels with the inventory
movements due to an accumulation of (many) errors whose traces are
’lost’.
• The distinction between the additive and the multiplicative modeling of
errors could be analogically motivated by the distinction between the ad-
ditive and the multiplicative modeling of the demand elasticity in the field
of the coordinated pricing and inventory decisions. The literature in this
field which has been reviewed by Yano and Gilbert (2004) and Huang et al.
(2013), shows that there exist significant differences between the optimal
pricing and inventory decisions when demand is additively or multiplica-
tively modeled (Petruzzi and Dada (1999)). Similarly to the inaccuracy
formulation discussed above, the demand variance for the additive for-
mulation is independent of price but the coefficient of demand variation
is increasing in price. In contrast to the additive model, the coefficient
of variation of demand in the multiplicative model is independent of the
price but its variance is decreasing in price (Huang et al. (2013)).
The notations used for the remainder of our paper are as follows:
• D the random variable representing the demand;
• f (F ): the PDF (CDF respectively) characterizing D;
• eIS (ePH): the random variable representing IS (PH) errors;
• µIS (µPH) the average of eIS (ePH);
• σIS (σPH) the standard deviation of eIS (ePH);
• Dm = D − eIS : a random variable combining the demand and the IS
error;
• fm (Fm): the PDF (CDF respectively) characterizing the variable Dm;
• µm : the mean of the random variable Dm;
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• e = eIS − ePH : a random variable that represents the difference between
the IS and the PH errors;
• g (G): the PDF (CDF respectively) characterizing the variable e;
• r: the unit selling price;
• c: the unit production cost (c ≤ r);
• wij the unit wholesale price paid by the e-Retailer under Approach j
(j = 1, 2, 3) and scenario i (i = DU,DC) - Scenario C is not applicable
since the supply chain is centralized, i.e.; there is not a wholesale price;
• bDCj : the unit buy-back cost used under the Decentralized Coordinated
scenario under Approach j (j = 1, 2, 3);
• s: the unit salvage cost (s ≤ c);
• P : the unit cost paid for a non satisfied commitment;
• Q∗ij : the optimal ordering quantity of Approach j (j = 1, 2, 3) under
scenario i (i = C,DU,DC);
• πij(.): the expected profit function of Approach j (j = 1, 2, 3) under
scenario i (i = C,DU,DC);
• π∗ij : the optimal expected profit of Approach j (j = 1, 2, 3) under scenario
i (i = C,DU,DC).
3. The Optimal Inventory Policy under Approach 1
3.1 Analysis of the Centralized (C) Case
In the centralized scenario, both the e-Retailer and the manufacturer are
part of the same organization and managed by the same institutional entity.
As a consequence, we can ignore the wholesale transaction and the relevant
price since these are not relevant. We note that the results provided in this
section improve the ones provided in Rekik (2011). We deliberately present the
centralized case in this paper for the sake of completeness and due to the fact
that the results associated with the decentralized scenarios are to be contrasted
to the centralized ones in the managerial insights section of this paper.
If D denotes the customers’ demand, the sequence of events described in Sec-
tion 2.1 enables us to deduce that the retailer’s commitment is C =Min(QIS , D).
The sales achieved then are Sales =Min(C,QPH). For a given vector (D,QPH , QIS),
the profit achieved by the inventory manager under the centralized case is given
by:
Profit = rMin [Min(QIS , D), QPH ] + s [QPH −Min(QIS , D)]
+
−cQPH − P [Min(QIS , D)−QPH ]
+
(1)
Elementary algebra and simplification enable us to write the achieved profit as
expressed in the following result:
Result 1. For a given vector (D,QPH , QIS), the profit achieved under the
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centralized case is as the following:
Profit = (r − c)D − (c− s) [QIS −D]
+
− (r − c) [D −QIS ]
+
−(r − c+ P )
{
(QIS −QPH)−Min
[
(QIS −D)
+
, (QIS −QPH
]}
+(c− s)Min
(
[QIS −D]
+
, (QIS −QPH)
)
(2)
where
• (r − c)D corresponds to the expected sales revenue.
• −(c−s) [QIS −D]
+
+(c−s)Min
(
[QIS −D]
+
, (QIS −QPH)
)+
corresponds
to the penalty related to an overstocking situation (overage penalty).
• −(r−c) [D −QIS ]
+
corresponds to the penalty incurred if a demand is not
satisfied when answering customers’ requests (type 1 underage penalty).
• −(r− c+P )
{
(QIS −QPH)−Min
[
(QIS −D)
+
, (QIS −QPH)
]}
corre-
sponds to the penalty incurred when a commitment is made and then not
respected (type 2 underage penalty).
Proof. The proof follows directly from the application of some elementary alge-
bra on Equation (1).
As previously mentioned, we consider an additive error structure. Considering
the variables Dm = D − eIS and e = eIS − ePH , the profit function achieved
under the Centralized scenario could be expressed as follows:
Profit = (r − c)D − (c− s)(Q−Dm)
+ − (r − c)(Dm −Q)
+
−(r − c+ P )
{
e−Min
[
(Q−Dm)
+, e
]}
+ (c− s)Min
[
(Q−Dm)
+, e
]
(3)
The following result states the expression of the expected profit, πC1(Q), achieved
under the Centralized scenario by the inventory manager for a given ordering
quantity Q:
Result 2. The Expected profit for the Centralized scenario is given by:
πC1(Q) = (r − c)µ− (c− s)
∫ Q
Dm=−∞
(Q−Dm)fm(Dm)dDm
−(r − c)
∫ +∞
Dm=Q
(Dm −Q)fm(Dm)dDm − (r − s+ P )E [A] + (c− s)E[e] (4)
where
E [A] =
∫ +∞
e=0
[
e [1− Fm(Q)] +
∫ Q
Dm=Q−e
[e− (Q−Dm)] fm(Dm)dDm
]
g(e)de
Proof. By defining A = {e−Min [(Q−Dm)
+, e]} and by observing that A = 0
if e < 0, the proof of this result is a straightforward exercise after applying
expectations and simplifying the profit function expressed in Equation 3.
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Under Approach 1, the inventory manager is aware of the errors occurring in
the inventory system. Further an accurate estimation procedure is assumed to
be in place, so that the parameters (mean and variance) associated with the
distribution of eIS and ePH are known. Based on this information, the optimal
ordering decision under Approach 1 may be derived considering the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Condition 1, the expected profit function is concave and
there exists a unique optimal ordering quantity Q∗C1 that maximizes the expected
function πC1(Q). Q
∗
C1 solves the following equation:
(r−s)Fm(Q
∗
C1)−(r−c)+(r−s+P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q
∗
C1 − e)− Fm(Q
∗
C1)] de = 0
(5)
where
• Condition 1: the unit cost paid if a commitment is non satisfied is such
that: P ≤ (r − s) G(0)1−G(0)
The optimal expected profit, π∗C1 = πC1(Q
∗
C1), is given by:
π∗C1 = (r − s)
∫ Q∗
C1
Dm=−∞
Dmfm(Dm)dDm − (c− s)E[e]
−(r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
[
e− e.F (Q∗C1 − e) +
∫ Q∗
C1
Dm=Q∗C1−e
Dmf(Dm)dDm
]
g(e)de (6)
Proof. Cf. Appendix A. Please note that all the appendices of the paper are
provided in the Electronic Companion.
The reader could remark that an improved concavity condition on the op-
timal ordering strategy is provided in our paper compared with Rekik (2011)
where two optimality conditions were proposed (one of them was concerned with
the distribution of the random variable Dm).
It could also be noticed that results associated with the Retailing context
(where the IS level does not play a role in the demand satisfaction processes
since the customers are physically present in the store and their demands are
conrfonted to the PH level) could be derived from our results of the e-Retailing
context by setting IS = PH and P = 0 (no comittement in the Retailing
context). For instance Equation 5 would apply to the Retailing context if we
remove from it the intergral part which is specific to the e-Retailing case.
For the remainder of our paper we consider, for demonstration purpose, a nu-
merical example the parameter values of which have been motivated by de Kok
et al. (2008), Atali et al. (2009) and Ko¨k and Shang (2007). The e-Retailer faces
a normally distributed demand with a mean µ = 20 and a standard deviation
σ = 4. IS and PH errors are normally distributed with means equal to zero.
The unit production cost is set to c = 2 and the unit salvage cost is set to
s = 1. We set σIS = 3 and study the evolution of the optimal strategy (optimal
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ordered quantity and expected profit) as a function of σPH for different values
of the cost parameters r and P . As in the study conducted by de Kok et al.
(2008), we consider two particular situations: i) a product with a low margin
where r = 2.5 and ii) an expensive product with a higher margin where r = 20.
The single parameter set discussed above is not constraining in terms of the
results we offer since additional analysis (not presented here) leads to the same
insights.
(a) Optimal ordering quantity (b) Optimal expected profit
Figure 1: Behavior A of the optimal strategy under the centralised case: products with a low
margin
(a) Optimal ordering quantity (b) Optimal expected profit
Figure 2: Behavior B of the optimal strategy under the centralised case: products with a high
margin
The results illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate an intuitively appealing
behavior of the expected profit which is always decreasing with the PH error
variability as well as with the commitment cost P . With regards to the optimal
ordering quantity, there are 2 possible behaviors depending on the margin values:
• For products with a high margin, when the unit shortage penalty (i.e. the
sum of the margin loss and the commitment cost, (r − c) + P ) is more
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important than the overstock penalty, which is equal to (c − s), Q∗C1 is
an increasing function of the variability of the PH error. This is a natural
consequence of the dominance of the unit shortage penalties that we aim
to decrease in the case of high margin products.
• For products with a low margin and for configurations according to which
the sum (r− c) +P is not as important in comparison with the overstock
penalty (c − s), Q∗C1 decreases with σPH in a first instance and then the
slope of the function changes to become an increasing one on σPH . In
this case, the initial behavior of Q∗C1 may be attributed to the dominance
of overstocking costs; however, there is a threshold value above which the
shortage penalties become dominant resulting in a necessary increase of
the ordered quantity. As shown in Figure 1 (a), this value depends on P .
In addition to the concavity condition improvement, we extend in the fol-
lowing the results provided by Rekik (2011) from a managerial point of view
by discussing: i) A policy adjusting the IS level before performing a commit-
ment; ii) The profit loss illustration when the e-retail context is optimized using
existing results pertaining to the retail context.
Remark 1.
We assumed in our analytical study that the commitment, C = Min(QIS , D),
is decided by contrasting the demand D with the quantity observed in the Infor-
mation System QIS since the PH level is not known. Once the optimal ordering
quantity Q∗ is decided and delivered, and before performing a commitment, the
e-Retailer might adjust the IS record in anticipation of a discrepancy between
the IS and the PH levels. Being aware that errors are additively modeled, the
inventory manager could provide a commitment after changing the IS level from
QIS to an adjusted one equal to Q
adj
IS = QIS + β, where β is an adjustment
parameter that could be positive or negative.
By rewriting the Expected profit provided in Eq. 1 where the Q is set equal
to the optimal ordering quantity given in Eq. 5 and where the Commitment is
replaced by the adjusted one, Cadj = Min(D,QIS + β), the e-Retailer obtains
an adjusted profit function that could be numerically maximized by finding the
best adjustment parameter β∗. Figures 3 and 4 provide the behavior of β∗ as
well as the relative gain resulting from the adjustment (calculated as a %) with
the unit commitment penalty P for different values of the variability of the PH
error. One could remark that:
• The magnitude of the adjustment is relatively low when compared with
the optimal ordering quantity (cf. Figures 3 (a) and 4 (a)). In fact the
inaccuracy issue appears to have been taken into account before ordering.
Consequently, the relative percentage gain provided in Figures 3 (b) and
4 (b) also appears not to be particularly marked.
• When an adjustment is being made it should be correctly calculated to
obtain a positive impact. A non-optimal adjustment will provide worse
results than the non-adjustment scenario.
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(a) Optimal ordering quantity (b) Optimal expected profit
Figure 3: Behavior A of the optimal adjustment strategy under the centralised case: products
with a low margin
(a) Optimal ordering quantity (b) Optimal expected profit
Figure 4: Behavior B of the optimal adjustment strategy under the centralised case: products
with a high margin
• As intuitively expected, the absolute value of the adjustment parameter
increases with the commitment penalty P and with the variability of the
errors. The commitment adjustment aims to tackle the cases where a
commitment is not satisfied.
• A less intuitive outcome of the numerical analysis is that the adjustment
parameter is always negative meaning that the inventory manager has to
underestimate his QIS level before performing the commitment. Such re-
sult could be explained as follows: the adjustment will impact the overage
type 2 penalty (i.e. the penalty associated with a commitment non sat-
isfaction) only in the configuration where QPH ≤ QIS ≤ D. In such a
configuration adjusting positively (negatively ) QIS will decrease the type
1 (type 2 respectively) overage cost. By remarking that the unit type
2 overage cost (r − c + P ) is higher than the unit type 1 overage cost
(r − c), the adjustment should be made on the negative side so that the
commitment non satisfaction may be well avoided.
By noting that the adjustment strategy applied by the e-Retailer does not im-
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pact the optimal ordering quantity (and consequentially does not change the
material transfer from the manufacturer side) and after remarking that the ad-
justment gain is relatively low, we assume for the remainder of the paper that
the e-Retailer does not intentionally change his commitment by adjusting his IS
quantity.
Remark 2.
We end our study of the centralized case by a comparative analysis of our
contribution with the performance of the inventory system if it is managed by
existing results in the inaccuracy literature. As mentioned in the introduction
section, almost all past investigations are concerned with the retail context
where the inaccuracy on the IS level is not integrated in the optimal decision. In
such situation, the inventory manager could assume that: 1) case 1: the IS errors
are simply set equal to zero, i.e., QIS = Q or 2) case 2: the IS errors are assumed
to be equal to the PH errors, i.e., QIS = QPH . Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the
relative profit losses when our optimal inventory policy (provided in Theorem
1) is not applied under the low and the high margin settings (respectively).
Relative profit loss (%)
(a) Relative loss under case 1
Relative profit loss (%)
(b) Relative loss under case 2
Figure 5: Relative profit losses (resulted from not employing the optimal policy) under the
centralized case: products with a low margin
Relative profit loss (%)
(a) Relative loss under case 1
Relative profit loss (%)
(b) Relative loss under case 2
Figure 6: Relative profit losses (resulted from not employing the optimal policy) under the
centralized case: products with a high margin
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It could be noticed that managing the inventory system under case 1 is more
penalizing than case 2 because IS errors are totally ignored. Case 2, known
in the literature as the random yield, improves the performance but remains a
suboptimal policy when QIS is different from QPH .
3.2 Analysis of the Decentralized Uncoordinated (DU) Case
Under the Decentralized Uncoordinated scenario, we assume that the man-
ufacturer and the e-Retailer are two independently owned and managed firms,
where each party is trying to maximize its own expected profit. We analyze
in this section the case where the two supply chain actors do not coordinate
their decisions and for this purpose, we consider the wholesale contract: the
manufacturer chooses the unit wholesale price wDU1 and the e-Retailer, after
observing wDU1 chooses the order quantity QDU1.
The e-Retailer’s Decision: The e-Retailer’s decision is the same as the one
in the Centralized scenario with the exception that the e-Retailer now pays a
wholesale price wDU1 to the manufacturer whose unit production cost is still c.
The expected profit for the e-Retailer is as follows:
πe−retailerDU1 (Q,wDU1) = (r − wDU1)µ− (wDU1 − s)
∫ Q
Dm=−∞
(Q−Dm)fm(Dm)dDm
−(r − wDU1)
∫ +∞
Dm=Q
(Dm −Q)fm(Dm)dDm − (r − s+ P )E [A]− (wDU1 − s)E[e] (7)
where:
E [A] =
∫ +∞
e=0
[
e [1− Fm(Q)] +
∫ Q
Dm=Q−e
[e− (Q−Dm)] fm(Dm)dDm
]
g(e)de
As shown in the analysis conducted for the centralized case, under Condition
1 introduced in Theorem 1, the e-Retailer’s profit function is concave and the
optimal ordering quantity is given by:
(r − s)Fm(Q
∗
DU1)− (r − wDU1)
+(r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q
∗
DU1 − e)− Fm(Q
∗
DU1)] de = 0 (8)
The Manufacturer’s Decision: The manufacturer is concerned with the
wholesale price wDU1 as a decision variable. The e-Retailer’s order may be antic-
ipated (known in advance) for any wholesale price. Consequently, the function
QDU1(wDU1) is deterministic as far as the manufacturer is concerned. The man-
ufacturer’s decision then is to choose the wholesale price wDU1 that maximizes
his expected profit πManufacturerDU1 (wDU1) which is as follows:
πManufacturerDU1 (wDU1) = (wDU1 − c)QDU1(wDU1) (9)
Theorem 2. Assuming that condition 1, introduced in the previous section, and
Condition 2 (discussed below) hold:
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1. The optimum is reached for Q∗DU1, such that:
1−a[Fm(Q
∗
DU1)+Qfm(Q
∗
DU1)]−d
∫ +∞
e=0
[Fm(Q
∗
DU1−e)+Q
∗
DU1fm(Q
∗
DU1−e)]g(e)de = 0
2. The corresponding optimum wholesale price is:
w∗DU1 = c+(r−c){aQ
∗
DU1fm(Q
∗
DU1)+d
∫ +∞
e=0
Q∗DU1fm(Q
∗
DU1−e)g(e)de}
3. The optimal expected profit of the manufacturer is:
πmanufacturer
∗
DU1 = (r−c)Q
∗
2
DU1{afm(Q
∗
DU1)+d
∫ +∞
e=0
fm(Q
∗
DU1−e)g(e)de}
4. The optimal expected profit of the e-Retailer is:
πe−retailer
∗
DU1 = π
e−retailer
DU1 (Q
∗
DU1, w
∗
DU1)
Where:
• a = (r−s)−(r−s+P )(1−G(0))
r−c
and d = r−s+P
r−c
• Condition 1: p ≤ (r − s) G(0)1−G(0)
• Condition 2: The random variable Dm is IGFR
2 and is such that fm/f
′
m
is an increasing function.
Proof. Cf. Appendix B.
Remark 3. We note that the IGFR condition is a well known one for wholesale
type contracts and is not restrictive in the sense that most common demand dis-
tributions confirm it (Larivie`re and Porteus (2001)). Common demand distri-
butions, in particular the normal one, verify also the fm/f
′
m increase condition.
For the same numerical example introduced in section 3.1 (µ = 20, σ = 4, c = 2,
s = 1 and σIS = 3), Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the behaviors of the ordering
strategy (optimal ordering quantity and optimal wholesale cost) as a function
of σPH for different values of P and r. As in the centralized case, two possible
behaviors of Q∗DU1 could be observed:
• Behavior A where the selling price is set to a low level resulting in a low
margin for the e-Retailer (the selling price is r = 5 and the proposed
wholesale cost is around 4.5 as illustrated in Figure 7 (b))3 . With a low
2Increasing General Failure Rate. A distribution is IGFR if its General Failure Rate defined
by the function g(x) = x
1−F (x)
f(x)
is weakly increasing for all x such that F (x) < 1 .
3This is a different r value than that utilized in the previous section in order to illustrate
the insights of our analysis in the best possible way. Please also note that the very graphical
presentation (e.g. scales used, origin of axes, etc) is ‘optimised’ by MATHEMATICA.
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margin, the overage penalty is more important than the underage ones
(types 1 & 2) and as a consequence we can observe a decrease of the
ordering quantity with σPH in the first part of the respective curves. For
higher σPH , errors are more impacting costs (especially the shortage and
commitment ones) and as a consequence, we can observe an increasing
Q∗DU1 to tackle the inaccuracy impact.
• Behavior B where the selling price is set to a higher level resulting in
a higher margin for the e-Retailer (the selling price is r = 20 and the
proposed wholesale cost is around 17 as illustrated in Figure 8 (b)). In
such cost configuration, the overage penalty is less important than the
underage ones and as consequence we always observe an increasing Q∗DU1
with σPH .
(a) Optimal ordering quantity (b) Optimal wholesale cost
Figure 7: Behavior A of the optimal quantity and wholesale cost under the DU case: products
with a low margin
(a) Optimal ordering quantity (b) Optimal wholesale cost
Figure 8: Behavior B of the optimal quantity and wholesale cost under the DU case: products
with a high margin
As intuitively expected in both behaviors, the ordering quantity increases with
the commitment cost P but we remark that the proposed wholesale price (pro-
vided by the manufacturer) is insensitive to changes of P value. Such remark
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enables us to explain the following observations on expected profits: in contrast
to the e-Retailer, the manufacturer obtains a higher profit when P increases (as
illustrated in Figures 9 and 10). In fact, when P increases, the e-Retailer orders
a higher quantity while the wholesale price stays unchanged which increases
(decreases) the expected profit of the Manufacturer (e-Retailer).
(a) Optimal Expected Profit for
the e-Retailer
*
1
erManufactur
DU
pi
PH
σ
5.0=P
2.0=P
0=P
5=r
(b) Optimal Expected Profit for
the Manufacturer
Figure 9: Behavior A of the optimal expected profit under the DU case: products with a low
margin
*Re
1
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DU
−pi
PH
σ
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20=r
(a) Optimal Expected Profit for
the e-Retailer
*
1
erManufactur
DU
pi
PH
σ
0=P
2=P
5=P
20=r
(b) Optimal Expected Profit for
the Manufacturer
Figure 10: Behavior B of the optimal expected profit under the DU case: products with a
high margin
3.3 Analysis of the Decentralized Coordinated (DC) Case
For the classical newsvendor problem, many solutions have been proposed to
improve the supply chain performance. In a classical buy-back contract, the
e-Retailer pays a wholesale price wDCj (j = 1, 2, 3) per unit ordered but can
return the excess order quantity at a partial refund bDCj (j = 1, 2, 3) at the end
of the selling season (Pasternack (1985)). As discussed by Cachon (2003), we
assume that the e-Retailer salvages the units and the manufacturer credits him
for the units subject to the buy-back agreement. Under Approach 1, we consider
a modified buy back contract according to which the manufacturer buys back
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only the quantities that have not been subject to IS errors. Quantities that
can be bought-back by the manufacturer correspond to the case where the PH
inventory is higher than the IS record and when the IS is lower than D. That is,
when overage stock is due to errors in the IS level, the relevant excess quantity
is not bought-back by the manufacturer. By such contract configuration, we
assume that the manufacturer is not responsible of errors affecting the IS of the
e-Retailer
The coordination solution of our problem necessitates three decision variables
to be determined: the wholesale price wDC1, the buy-back payment bDC1 and
the ordering quantity QDC1. It is obvious that there are many possible com-
binations with respect to who is determining which decision variables. The
determination of all three variables by either the manufacturer or the e-Retailer
alone constitutes an extreme case. Lariviere (1998) presents a quantity-forcing
contract that eliminates the e-Retailer’s choice. If such a contract allows coor-
dinating performances for the supply chain, the profits’ share is generally not
impartial. In practice, the determination of either one of, or both, wDC1 and
bDC1 by the e-Retailer is not reflective of real-world practices. Indeed, the e-
Retailer tends to maximize bDC1 or to minimize wDC1 in order to optimize his
objective function that will most probably yield to inefficient supply chain so-
lutions and/or non-appealing solutions to the manufacturer. A more realistic
case is when the manufacturer determines wDC1 and bDC1 and the e-Retailer
determines Q∗DC1. In certain cases, the market may impose certain values on
some of these variables (such as the type of competition, etc.). In a newsvendor
setting, the imposed variable is generally, the wholesale price wDC1.
The e-Retailer’s Decision: The e-Retailer decision is the same as the one
under a wholesaling contract with two exceptions: i) The salvage cost s is
replaced by s + bDU1; ii) Since the manufacturer does not buy-back overage
quantities resulting from IS errors, the e-Retailer’s profit is decreased by bDU1
multiplied by the quantity that is not bought-back in such a situation.
There are two scenarios according to which quantities are not bought-back by
the manufacturer: i) QPH ≥ D ≥ QIS : the quantity which is not bought-back
is D−QIS ; and ii) D ≥ QPH ≥ QIS : the quantity which is not bought-back is
QPH−QIS . The expected quantity that is not bought-back by the manufacturer
is written as follows:
E(B) =
∫ 0
e=−∞
[−e{1− Fm(Q− e)}+
∫ Q−e
x=Q
(x−Q)fm(x)dx]g(e)de (10)
Consequently, the e-Retailer’s expected profit is given by:
πe−retailerDC1 (Q,wDC1, bDC1) = (r − wDC1)µD + (wDC1 − s− bDC1)E[e]− bDC1E [B]
−(wDC1 − s− bDC1)
∫ Q
Dm=−∞
(Q−Dm)fm(Dm)dDm
−(r − wDC1)
∫ +∞
Dm=Q
(Dm −Q)fm(Dm)dDm − (r − s− bDC1 + P )E [A] (11)
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For a given (wDC1, bDC1), as in the centralized case, Condition 1 is sufficient
to verify the concavity of the e-Retailer expected profit. The optimal ordered
quantity should satisfy:
(r − wDC1)− [−P + (r − s+ P )G(0)]Fm(Q
∗
DC1)
−(r − s− b+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q
∗
DC1 − e)] de+ b
∫ 0
e=−∞
F (Q∗DC1 − e)g(e)de = 0
The Manufacturer’s Decision:
When the e-Retailer orders the quantity Q, the expected profit of the manufac-
turer is as follows:
πmanufacturerDC1 (Q,wDC1, bDC1) = (wDC1 − c)Q− bDC1
∫ Q
Dm=0
(Q−Dm)fm(Dm)dDm
− bDC1E(A)− bDC1E[e] + bDC1E(B) (12)
To determine the set (wDC1, bDC1) enabling the coordination, we assume that
wDC1 is fixed and we derive the value of bDC1 permitting to have an opti-
mal ordering quantity for the manufacturer (resulting from the optimization of
Equation 12) equal to the e-Retailer’s one (Equation 11).
Theorem 3. Under Approach 1, for a given wDC1 the channel is coordinated
for (b∗
DC1
, Q∗
DC1
) solving the following two-variable equation system:
b∗
DC1
=
wDC1 − c∫ +∞
e=−∞
Fm(Q∗DC1 − e)g(e)de
(r − wDC1)− [−P + (r − s+ P )G(0)]Fm(Q
∗
DC1)
−(r − s− b∗DC1 + P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q
∗
DC1 − e)] de
+b∗DC1
∫ 0
e=−∞
F (Q∗DC1 − e)g(e)de = 0
Proof. cf. Appendix C.
At this point we should remark that the optimal ordering quantity under the
decentralized coordinated scenario is equal to the one under the Centralized
Scenario Q∗DC1 = Q
∗
C1 where :
(r − s)Fm(Q
∗
C1)− (r − c) + (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q
∗
C1 − e)− Fm(Q
∗
C1)] de = 0
For a given wDC1, the manufacturer is able to coordinate the supply chain by
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offering a buy-back unit cost equal to:
b∗
DC1
=
wDC1 − c∫ +∞
e=−∞
Fm(Q∗C1 − e)g(e)de
(13)
In other words, when the pricing rules defined by the 2-tuple (wDC1, b
∗
DC1) are
established by the manufacturer, the ordering quantity decided by the e-Retailer
coincides with the ordering quantity of the Centralized scenario Q∗DC1 = Q
∗
C1
and the optimal expected profit of the whole supply chain is also the one achieved
under the centralized case.
4. Managerial Insights: Information and RFID impacts
The aim of this section is twofold: i) To analyze the impact of errors on
the inventory system and in particular to assess how the performance could be
improved by taking into account errors when establishing the ordering decision.
That is, we provide a comparison between approaches 1 & 2; and ii) To analyze
the impact of the RFID technology on the inventory system. To do so, we
will study the comparative performance of approaches 1 & 3 and we will derive
conditions on the RFID tag cost that render the RFID deployment cost effective.
Please recall that results related to Approaches 2 and 3 are presented in the
Electronic Companion of the paper. It is also important to recall that we assume
in this paper that the RFID deployment leads to a visibility on errors permitting
ta align the PH and the IS levels. The case where RFID prevents errors could
also analysed by modeling the RFID approach using Approach 1 results by
considering lower errors parameters. For the numerical analysis, we consider
the same parameters values used in the previous sections (µ = 20; σ = 4; c = 2;
s = 1; σIS = 3) but we limit the presentation to products with a high margin
(r = 20) only. The insights derived below are the same for products with a low
margin as well.
4.1 Comparison of Approaches 1 & 2: Benefit of the Information on Errors
To analyze the potential effects of an ordering strategy that takes into account
information on errors (their probability distributions), let us compare numeri-
cally the optimal expected profits for each supply chain actor under approaches
1 & 2.
4.1.1 The Centralized (C) Case
Under the centralized scenario, it is straightforward to observe (as illustrated
in Figure 11 (b)) and to prove that the benefit of estimating errors is always
present since Q∗C1 optimizes the expected profit function πC1(.). Q
∗
C2 which
is used under Approach 2 is a sub-optimal solution for the inventory manager
under the centralized case. To tackle the inaccuracy issue, Q∗C1 should be higher
than Q∗C2 as illustrated in Figure 11 (a).
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∗
C2
*
2Cpi
*
1Cpi
PHσ
2;20 == Pr
(b) π∗C1 vs π
∗
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Figure 11: Implications of estimating errors under the C scenario
4.1.2 The Decentralized Uncoordinated (DU) Case
Under the Decentralized Uncoordinated scenario, the situation is different (cf.
Figure 12) since the manufacturer may in fact face some negative consequences
when estimating and taking into account error distributions. When errors are
estimated and taken into account in the ordering strategy, the e-Retailer tends
to order a higher quantity than the error free model (cf. figure 12 (d)). When the
ordered quantity is higher, the wholesale price provided by the manufacturer is
lower (as illustrated in figure 12 (c)). As a consequence, estimating errors leads
the manufacturer to decrease his unit margin and the expected profit is not
improved for the manufacturer even if the ordered quantity is higher.
4.1.3 The Decentralized Coordinated (DC) Case
Under the Decentralized Coordinated scenario, the power of each supply chain
actor is controlled as stated in Result 5 (provided in the Electronic Companion
of the paper) by the value of ǫ. For a given value of ǫ, the wholesale price is
deduced for both approaches and the buy-back cost is calculated such that the
channel is coordinated. With regards to the comparison of Approaches 1 & 2, the
situation is totally different from what it was the case for the previous scenario
since we may observe (cf. Figures 13 and 14) that estimating errors offers
improvements to the manufacturer and not to the e-Retailer regardless of how
power is assigned in a supply chain (i.e. regardless of whether the manufacturer
or the e-Retailer has more power). Such a result may be explained in terms
of the design of the modified buy-back contract under Approach 1. In fact,
recall that we assumed the manufacturer to buy back only quantities that have
not been subject to IS errors. Obtaining information about error distributions
permits to change the ordering vector (QDC1, wDC1, bDC1) and in particular to
increase the ordering quantity which results in a higher risk that the e-Retailer
finishes the selling period with more unsold inventory that won’t be bought-back
by the manufacturer.
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Figure 12: Implications of estimating errors under the DU scenario
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Figure 14: Implications of estimating errors under the DC Scenario: power is assigned to the
e-Retailer ǫ = r−c
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4.2 Comparison of Approaches 1 & 3: the Impact of the RFID Deployment
The aim of this section is to provide the conditions under which the RFID
deployment is cost effective. We do so by comparing approaches 1 & 3 under
the three supply chain structures considered in our work.
4.2.1 The Centralized (C) Case
Under the centralized scenario, we are able to provide an analytical expres-
sion of the critical RFID tag cost over which RFID deployment is not recom-
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mended. This is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4. We can identify a critical tag cost tc such that for t ≥ tc the imple-
mentation of the RFID technology yields a negative benefit under the centralized
scenario. tc solves:
∫ F−1
m
[ r−c
r−s
]
F
−1
m [
r−c−tc
r−s
]
Dmfm(Dm)dDm =
r − s+ P
r − s
(1−G(0)) (14)
Proof. Let’s define QRY = F
−1
m [
r−c
r−s
] which corresponds to the optimal quantity
ordered under a centralized random yield problem with an additive error setting
(cf. Rekik et al. (2007b)). First, it is straightforward to verify that Q∗C3 ≤
QRY ≤ Q
∗
C1 by comparing the expression of QRY with the ones of Q
∗
C1 and Q
∗
C3
provided by equations (5) and (8) (Appendix D in the Electronic Companion of
the paper), respectively.
If t is such that t ≥ tc, we deduce that
∫ F−1
m
[ r−c
r−s
]
F
−1
m [
r−c−t
r−s
]
Dmfm(Dm)dDm ≥
r−s+P
r−s
(1−
G(0)) which could also written as
∫ QRY
Q∗
C3
Dmfm(Dm)dDm ≥
r−s+P
r−s
(1 − G(0)).
Using the fact that QRY ≤ Q
∗
C1, we deduce that
∫ Q∗
C1
Q∗
C3
Dmfm(Dm)dDm ≥
r−s+P
r−s
(1 − G(0)) which can easily be used to verify that πC1(Q
∗
C1) (Eq. 6) is
higher than πC3(Q
∗
C3) (Eq. (8) of Appendix D in the Electronic Companion of
the paper).
It is important to note that the analytical expression of tc provided in Theorem
4 corresponds to the maximum value of the RFID tag cost over which the RFID
technology is not beneficial from an economical point of view. The effective
RFID critical tag cost, teffc under which RFID is cost effective solves the equa-
tion π∗C1 = π
∗
C3 as illustrated in Figure 15 (b). Solving numerically π
∗
C1 = π
∗
C3
permits us to deduce the results presented in Figure 15 (a) where the behavior
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of teffc is illustrated. Figure 15 (a) illustrates the behavior of the critical tag
cost tc as a function of the PH error variability and P .
0=P
2=P
5=Peff
ct 20=r
PHσ
(a) Evolution of teffc with σPH
and P
PHσ
0* 3 =tCpi
1.0* 3 =tCpi
2.0* 3 =tCpi
*
1Cpi
(b) Approach 1 vs Approach 3
Figure 15: Implications of deploying the RFID technology under the C scenario
We notice that teffc increases with both σPH and P : that is, when errors re-
sult in higher penalties to the performance of the inventory system, the RFID
deployment is easier to justify from an economical point of view.
We extend in the following the managerial insight under the centralized scenario
by comparing the attrictiveness of the RFID technology in the Retailing and
e-Retailing context. The critical RFID tag cost above which RFID is not cost
effective in the Retailing context could be derived from Theorem 4 by setting
the right hand side of equation equal to 12 .
A comparative study between the Retailing and the e-Retailing context permits
to derive interesting managerial insights concerning the degree of the RFID
attractiveness:
• Figure 16 (a) illustrates the ratio between the critical tag cost in the
retailing and e-Retailing context. A ratio higher than one means RFID is
cost effective up to a critical tag price, which is higher in the e-Retailing
context than the retailing one; that is, RFID is easier to economically
justify in the e-Retailing context than the Retailing one.
• According to figure 16 (a), RFID is always easier to justify in the e-
Retailing context if the IS error average is lower than the PH one; this is
independent of the value taken by the commitment unit cost P . If the IS
average stock is underestimated, both the u1 and h penalties are higher in
the e-Retailing context as compared to the Retailing one and consequently
the need for RFID to provide visibility is more important.
• In the case where the IS average is higher than the PH one, it exists a
couple (P , µPH) permitting to delimit the attractiveness of RFID (cf.
Figure 16 (b)). Compared to the retailer, for small IS −PH inaccuracies
and small P values, the e-Retailer could profit from the inaccuracies by
committing more (so decreasing his u1 penalty) and additionally profiting
from a smaller end stock (which decreases his h penalty). In such a case
the e-Retailer’s interest to the RFID technology is lower than that of the
retailer until the commitment penalties (u2) become more important.
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Figure 16: RFID attractivenss: e-Retail vs Retail
4.2.2 The Decentralized Uncoordinated (DU) Case
Comparing approaches 1 & 3 under the DU scenario (cf Figure (17)), permits
us to deduce an interesting impact of the RFID deployment. The manufacturer
would be better off without RFID since inaccuracy errors permit him to produce
and sell more units to the e-Retailer. In addition, since RFID offers visibility to
the e-Retailer the relevant benefit depends on the gap between IS and PH errors.
In Figure (17), the benefit of the e-Retailer and manufacturer is presented as a
function of the RFID tag cost, and for r = 20, P = 0, σPH = 1 and σIS = 3.
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Figure 17: Implications of deploying the RFID technology under the DU scenario
As mentioned in the Appendix associated with the Decentralized RFID sce-
nario without coordination (cf. Remark 4 in the Electronic Companion), the
research and practical question associated with the RFID tag cost sharing be-
tween the two supply chain actors has no particular meaning under the ’take it
or leave it’ contract with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader. In fact
the manufacturer is the one that fixes the wholesale price w and will include
it in the additional RFID tag cost if he is charged with the technology cost.
Our managerial findings are different from the result provided by (Choi, 2011)
where the problem is modeled in a way that the RFID could influence the de-
mand profile. In the presence of the RFID technology, the author assumes that
the real demand is being met because shelf replenishment may be performed in
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a continuous and accurate way. Without RFID, the replenishment is done on
a periodic basis and consequently the effective demand is shrunk by the shelf
capacity. In addition to this difference concerning demand modeling, the author
also considers risk analysis in his framework and shows that the manufacturer’s
level risk can be reduced when RFID is deployed.
4.2.3 The Decentralized Coordinated (DC) Case
The implications of RFID are different under the DC scenario since by coordi-
nating the channel, some conditions on the RFID tag cost should be respected
so that the technology deployment is cost effective for both supply chain actors.
In fact, critical RFID tag costs ensuring a positive benefit, could be deduced
for each supply chain actor (cf Figure (18)). Such critical RFID costs are linked
directly to the coordination parameters, especially, to the parameter ǫ which
governs the power of each actor. The implication of using the RFID technology
are presented in Figure 18 for r = 20, P = 0, σPH = 1, σIS = 3 and ǫ =
r−c
5 .
For a given power configuration of each SC actor in Approach 2, we can derive
the unit RFID tag cost under which the technology deployment is cost effective
and ensures the same power sharing under the RFID Approach (i.e. the shar-
ing configuration of the total supply chain profit is the same with and without
RFID).
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Figure 18: Implications of deploying the RFID technology under the DC scenario
We further extend the analysis by assuming that the RFID tag cost is fixed
(exogenous variable fixed by the RFID tag market) and we derive the potential
loss or gain in power for each SC actor to ensure that the technology deployment
is cost effective. In other words, we assess who should make concessions in his
power distribution and at which scale in order to enable the RFID deployment.
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Figure 19: Impact of deploying the RFID technology on the power sharing configuration
Figure 19 (a) (Figure 19 (b)) illustrates for an initial e-Retailing power under
Approach 2, Power R 2, what the e-Retailing power under Approach 3 should
become from a e-Retailer’s (Manufacturer) perspective. For example, let us
assume that the e-Retailer power is 0.25 under approach 2 (which means that
the e-Retailer has 25% of the centralized supply chain profit under DC2 and
the manufacturer has the remaining 75%) and let’s suppose that the RFID tag
price is t=0.01 (red curves). According to Figure 19 (b) (Figure 19 (a)), the
Manufacturer (e-Retailer respectively) would accept to deploy RFID if the new
e-Retailer power under approach 3 becomes equal to 1.03 (0.98 respectively) the
power under approach 2, i.e. 25.75% (24.50% respectively). In other words, the
Manufacturer (e-Retailer) could decrease his power by 0.75% (0.5% respectively)
in order to adopt the RFID technology if its cost is equal to t=0.01: both of them
could make a sacrifice. The Manufacturer’s sacrifice will stop and will become
a reclaim for additional power for high values of the RFID tag cost (blue curve)
when the technology becomes harmful for the entire supply chain (centralized
profit under approach 3 is lower than the one under approach 2). It is interesting
to notice (not intuitively expected) that the manufacturer’s sacrifice decreases
with the e-Retailer initial power while the e-Retailer’s sacrifice is independent
of it. The e-Retailer does not profit from the RFID technology to gain more
power and the manufacturer becomes sparing of power sacrifice if his initial
power without RFID is higher.
4.3 Summary Managerial Insights
The main managerial contributions of the paper could be summerized as
follows:
• Compared to the well-studied Retailing context under inventory inaccura-
cies, our work in the e-Retailing context showed some conflicting manage-
rial results on the behavior of the optimal ordering strategy. The ordered
quantity in the centralized case is not monotonously behaving as shown in
Figure 1. Such a behavior impacts the interaction between the e-Retailer
and its manufacturer as well as the RFID adoption decision.
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• Our results on the e-retail context extend previous retail-related ones since
the latter could be derived by setting IS=PH and the commitment penalty
P = 0.
• Managing the e-retail context subject to inventory inaccuracies with exist-
ing results (associated with the error free model, the random yield problem
or results specifically developped for the Retailing context) sets the system
in suboptimal situations with non-negligible loss in the profit function.
• The e-Retailer could apply an adjustment policy according to which the
IS record is changed before providing a commitment. We showed how and
when the adjustment could be done and we deduced that the adjustment
should be well performed otherwise the system will be set in a suboptimal
situation. The adjustment strategy we propose could be linked to recent
studies around the superimposition of human judgement on statistically
derived decisions in Operations Management, such as demand forecasts
(Syntetos et al. (2009), (Syntetos et al., 2010)) or replenishment decisions
(Syntetos et al. (2015)).
• We suggest that studying the additive error structure may be a more
pragmatic approach since it is not straightforward to empirically identify
multiplicative links between error realizations and actual stock levels.
• Regarding the RFID as a solution to tackle inaccuracies, we derived con-
ditions under which its deployment is cost effective. We focused on the
comparison of the degree of attractiveness of the technology under the
retail and e-retail contexts. We intuitively expected to find RFID more
attractive in the e-retail context (because of the additional shortage type
2 cost), but we showed that the errors in the IS could be beneficial in
some situations and rendering the RFID less attractive as compared to
the retail case.
• In contrast with existing managerial results and intuitive expectations, we
showed that the RFID sharing cost between supply chain actors under a
wholesale contract is not a relevant issue; we illustrated how the manufac-
turer could indirectly reflect in the wholesale price his part of the RFID
cost.
• Under the same contract, we showed that it is not certain that the e-
Retailer will have a manufacturer interested in deploying RFID because
errors increase the orders and consequently the margin of the manufac-
turer. This managerial result depends on the way the RFID impacts the
inventory system. In a set of investigations (Gaukler et al. (2007), Choi
(2011), RFID presence is shown to improve the profile of the demand and
consequently its deployment could be of interest to the manufacturer since
it leads to an increase of the sales of the Retailer. In our model, the de-
mand is not impacted by the RFID presence; however, the commitment
and the sales are impacted if RFID enables the alignment between the IS
30
and the PH levels. Without RFID the e-Retailer orders more to antici-
pate errors, which increases the manufacturer revenue. A risk analysis as
performed by Choi (2011) would further enrich the managerial insights.
• Under the coordination scenario, RFID could become an interesting al-
ternative to both supply chain actors to avoid the double marginalization
effect.
• In addition to finding the threshold RFID tag cost under which the tech-
nology is cost effective under the coordination scenario, we also studied
the impact on the supply chain power loss and/or gain for each actor if the
RFID cost is assumed to be an exogenous variable fixed by the technology
market.
5. Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper, we have been concerned with the implications of inventory
inaccuracies on the performance of an electronic supply chain channel. An e-
Retailing context was considered for demonstration purposes but our results
apply to any other upstream supply chain actor (such as a supplier or a distrib-
utor) where orders are received electronically. An analytical framework has been
developed for the purposes of our work, built on the premise that the inventory
inaccuracy problem can be seen as an extended random yield problem. We have
proved the connection under concern and studied analytically the effects of in-
accuracy errors that may be present either in the physical inventory and/or the
IS records. Both centralized and decentralized supply chains have been consid-
ered in conjunction with three possible approaches for handling the errors: i)
errors are estimated and subsequently the information under concern is utilized
for the purpose of improving performance; ii) the errors are ignored, and iii)
errors are dealt with through the RFID employment. Comparisons of the first
and the third approach with the naive approach where errors are ignored led to
important insights with regards to the implications of error estimation and the
RFID employment respectively.
In particular, and for a decentralized uncoordinated supply chain, error estima-
tion may lead to a reduction of the manufacturer’s profit margin as compared
to the case where errors are just ignored. In contrast, the e-Retailer will almost
always find such an estimation procedure beneficial. The picture is different for
decentralized coordinated supply chains where error estimation offers improve-
ments only to the manufacturer and not to the e-Retailer regardless of how the
power between the supply chain players is distributed. For the centralized case,
error estimation offers a clear benefit.
With regards to the RFID deployment, performance in the centralized scenario
is subject to the RFID tag cost. For a decentralized uncoordinated supply chain,
the manufacturer is found to be better off without RFID since inaccuracy errors
permit him to produce and sell more units to the e-Retailer. Since RFID offers
visibility to the e-Retailer, the relevant benefit depends on the gap between the
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information system and physical inventory levels. Finally, for the decentralized
coordinated scenario, critical RFID tag costs may be deduced for each supply
chain actor ensuring a positive benefit; such costs link directly to the power
available to the supply chain members.
An important assumption upon which the first approach discussed above was
developed is the fact that a mechanism is in place to accurately estimate inac-
curacy errors. Although some work has been performed with regards to error
estimation (see section 3.2), further contributions that link error estimation
methodologies with the inventory inaccuracy problem would be very valuable
additions to the current state of knowledge. In addition, it is important to note
that our analytical developments have been conducted under the assumption
that the inaccuracy errors may be adequately represented by an additive struc-
ture. Although such an error representation reflects many real-world cases, it
would certainly be worthwhile extending the analysis conducted here to consider
the case of multiplicative and mixed error settings as well. Further, our work
has been developed upon a single period formulation and in the next steps of our
research we plan to extend our proposed framework to the multi-period setting.
Finally, and given the prevalence of electronic supply chains in modern busi-
ness settings, further work into the modelling requirements and idiosyncrasies
of such chains would appear to be merited.
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6. Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Starting from the definition of A = {e−Min [(Q−Dm)
+, e]} and by using
Leibniz Formula4, the first derivative of E [A] with respect to Q is given by:
dE[A]
dQ
= −
∫ +∞
e=0
∫ Q
xm=Q−e
fm(xm)g(e)dxmde
=
∫ +∞
e=0
[Fm(Q− e)− Fm(Q)] g(e)de
The first derivative of the expected profit function πC1(Q) with respect to Q
can also be derived:
dπC1(Q)
dQ
= (r − c)− (r − s)Fm(Q) + (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q)− Fm(Q− e)] de
= (r − c)− [r − s− (r − s+ P )(1−G(0))]Fm(Q)
− (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q− e)] de
= (r − c)− [−P + (r − s+ P )G(0)]Fm(Q)
− (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q− e)] de
The second derivative of the expected profit function is given as follows:
d2πC1(Q)
d2Q
= −[−P + (r − s+ P )G(0)]fm(Q)− (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [fm(Q− e)] de
Under Condition 1, it is clear that the expected profit function is concave and
is maximized for Q∗C1 verifying:
(r − s)Fm(Q
∗
C1)− (r − c) + (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
g(e) [Fm(Q
∗
C1 − e)− Fm(Q
∗
C1)] de = 0
7. Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
From Equation 9 (provided in the main paper), we derive the relationship
between the wholesaling contract and the quantity subsequently ordered by the
4Leibniz Formula: d
dy
∫ a2(y)
a1(y)
h(x, y)dx =
∫ a2(y)
a1(y)
∂h(x,y)
∂y
dx + h (a2(y), y) a
′
2(y) −
h (a1(y), y) a
′
1(y)
1
e-retailer as:
wDU1(Q) = r−(r−s)Fm(Q)−(r−s+P )
∫ +∞
e=0
[Fm(Q−e)−Fm(Q)]g(e)de (15)
By denoting k=G(0)(r-s+p)-p, the wholesale price is written as:
wDU1(Q) = r − kFm(Q)− (r − s+ P )
∫ +∞
e=0
[Fm(Q− e)]g(e)de (16)
Such a relationship is deterministic for the manufacturer who has to chose the
best wholesale price which maximizes his expected profit πDU1(Q) = (wDU1 −
c)Q. Using the methodology employed by Larivie`re and Porteus (2001), we
will deduce a condition on the probability distribution function permitting to
show the concavity of the manufacturer’s profit function. For this purpose let
us denote by R(Q) = wDU1(Q)Q the manufacturer’s revenue function. The first
derivative of R(Q) is as follows:
R
′
(Q) = wDU1[1−
1
v(Q)
] (17)
where v(Q) = −wDU1
Q.w
′
DU1
(Q)
measures the price sensitivity. It is the percent de-
crease (increase) in the e-retailer’s order from a percent increase (decrease) in
the wholesale price at stocking level Q. The second derivative of the revenue
function is as follows:
R
′′
(Q) = −k[Qf
′
m(Q) + 2fm(Q)]
−(r − s+ p)
∫ +∞
e=0
[Qf
′
m(Q− e) + 2fm(Q− e)]g(e)de
If Q ≤ µm, R
′′
(Q) is clearly positive. Otherwise we need two additional as-
sumptions to show that the first order conditions are sufficient to derive the
optimal ordering quantity of the decentralized uncoordinated scenario. If k is
positive, i.e. if condition 3 is satisfied, and if Dm is IGFR, we can use Larivie`re
and Porteus (2001)’s results in addition to condition 2 defined in Theorem 2 to
show that the revenue function is unimodal and concave on an interval [a, Q¯) (Q¯
corresponds to the least upper bound on the set of points such that v(Q) ≥ 1).
Within the interval [µm, Q¯), we use the fact that (Qf
′
m(Q)+2fm(Q)) is positive
(IGFR assumption) and we show that
∫ +∞
e=0
[Qf
′
m(Q − e) + 2fm(Q − e)]g(e)de
is also positive. For this purpose we simply use condition 2: f
f
′ is increasing
and fm is decreasing for all values higher than the average µm. The manufac-
turer’s first order condition may be written as expressed in point 1 of Theorem
2. The proof of the other three points is a direct consequence of the first order
condition.
2
8. Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
The first derivative of the manufacturer’s expected profit is given as follows:
∂πmanufacturerDC1 (Q,wDC1, bDC1)
∂Q
= (wDC1 − c)− bDC1Fm(Dm)dDm
− bDC1
∂E(A)
∂Q
+ bDC1
dE(B)
dQ
∂E(A)
∂Q
= −
∫ +∞
e=0
[Fm(Q)− Fm(Q− e)]g(e)d
∂E(B)
∂Q
=
∫ 0
e=−∞
[Fm(Q)− Fm(Q− e)]g(e)de
As a consequence :
∂πmanufacturerDC1 (Q,wDC1, bDC1)
∂Q
= (wDC1 − c)− bDC1
∫ +∞
e=−∞
Fm(Q− e)g(e)de
The second derivative of the manufacturer’s expected profit could also be written
as follows:
∂2πmanufacturerDC1 (Q,wDC1, bDC1)
∂2Q
= −bDC1
∫ +∞
e=−∞
fm(Q− e)g(e)de = −bDC1(fm × g)
which is clearly negative.
The first condition of the manufacturer’s expected profit permits us do derive
the expression of the buy-back unit cost:
bDC1 =
wDC1 − c∫ +∞
e=−∞
Fm(Q− e)g(e)de
For a given wDC1 , to coordinate the channel, the optimal ordering quanti-
ties associated with the optimization of the manufacturer and the e-retailer’s
decision should be the same.
9. Appendix D. Results associated with Approaches 2 & 3 which
are derived from the classical literature
Approach 2 under the Centralized case: Errors are Ignored
Please recall that errors are not taken into account when establishing the
ordering decisions under Approach 2. The e-retailer and the manufacturer’s
decisions are also independent of the error parameters. Under a newsvendor
framework, they will establish their decisions based on the error free models (in
3
C, DU and DC scenarios), i.e., their decisions for each scenario correspond to
the newsvendor ordering strategy independently of the presence of errors.
For the Centralized scenario, the ordered quantity under Approach 2 is simply
equal to the optimal newsvendor quantity and is given by:
Q∗C2 = Q
∗
Newsvendor = F
−1
[
r − c
r − s
]
(18)
When ordering Q∗C2, the profit achieved by the inventory manager is not the
optimal profit of the basic newsvendor problem, but rather:
π∗C2 = πC1(Q
∗
C2) (19)
Approach 3 under the Centralized case: the RFID Enabled Approach
Under Approach 3, the RFID technology leads to the removal of discrepan-
cies between the IS and the PH inventories. We assume that the RFID tech-
nology only provides visibility (IS inventory level = Physical inventory level)
but does not eliminate the inaccuracy errors. The inventory problem is also the
same as the classical random yield problem with an additional cost pertaining
to the RFID tag t embedded to each product. The random yield problem under
an additive error setting is nothing but the classical newsvendor problem where
the demand distribution D is replaced by the random variable Dm (cf Rekik
et al. (2007b) for more details). As a consequence the analysis of Approach
3 under the different scenarios (C, DU and DC) is derived from newsvendor
related results where the production cost c is replaced by c+ t and the demand
distribution D is replaced by that of Dm.
For a given vector (D,QIS = QPH), the profit could be written as follows:
Profit = (r − c− t)[D −QIS ]
+ + (c+ t− s)[QIS −D]
+
= (r − c− t)[D − (QC3 + eIS)]
+ + (c+ t− s)[(QC3 + eIS)−D]
+
= (r − c− t)[Dm −QC3]
+ + (c+ t− s)[QC3 −Dm]
+ (20)
Under the Centralized scenario, the general form of the expected profit as a
function of the model parameters is given by:
πC3(QC3) = (r − c− t)µ− (r − c− t)
∫ +∞
Dm=QC3
(Dm −QC3)fm(Dm)dDm
− (c+ t− s)
∫ QC3
Dm=−∞
(QC3 −Dm)fm(Dm)dDm (21)
The expected profit function is concave and is maximized at the value of Q∗
C3
such that:
Fm(Q
∗
C3) =
r − (c+ t)
r − s
(22)
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The optimal expected profit for Approach 3 in the Centralized scenario is given
by:
π∗C3 = πC3(Q
∗
C3
)
= (r − s)
∫ Q∗
C3
Dm=−∞
Dmfm(Dm)dDm (23)
Approach 2 under the Decentralized Uncoordinated case: Errors are Ignored
Under Approach 2, errors are ignored and the optimal ordering strategy
is the same as the one of the error free model, i.e. the newsvendor problem.
The following result states the ordering quantity and the wholesale price, re-
sulting from the optimization of the error free framework that is utilized under
Approach 2:
Result 3. Larivie`re and Porteus (2001)
Under Approach 2, the first-order condition is sufficient and its solution is a
unique global maximum for an IGFR demand distribution
1. The optimum is reached for Q∗
DU2
, such that: 1−F (Q∗
DU2
)−Q∗
DU2
f(Q∗
DU2
) =
c−s
r−s
2. The corresponding optimum wholesale price is w∗DU2 = c+(r−s)Q
∗
DU2f(Q
∗
DU2)
Proof. Cf Larivie`re and Porteus (2001)
• The expect profit of the manufacturer is
πManufacturer∗DU2 = (w
∗
DU2 − c)Q
∗
DU2 (24)
• The expect profit of the e-retailer is obtained by considering the expected
profit of Approach 1:
πe−retailer∗DU2 = π
e−retailer
DU1 (Q
∗
DU2, w
∗
DU2) (25)
Approach 3 under the Decentralized Uncoordinated case: the RFID Enabled Ap-
proach
The formulation and the optimization of Approach 3 is similar to that con-
ducted in Larivie`re and Porteus (2001) with a unit production cost c+ t and by
considering the demand Dm instead of D.
The e-retailer’s Decision:. The expected profit function of the retailer is given
by:
πe−retailer
DU3
(Q
DU3
, w
DU3
) = (r − w
DU3
)µ− (r − w
DU3
)
∫ +∞
Dm=QDU3
(Dm −QDU3)fm(Dm)dDm
− (w
DU3
− s)
∫ Q
DU3
Dm=−∞
(Q
DU3
−Dm)fm(Dm)dDm (26)
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The optimal ordering quantity should also verify:
Q∗
DU3
(w
DU3
) = F−1m
[
r − w
DU3
r − s
]
(27)
The Manufacturer’s Decision:. The manufacturer treats the wholesale price as
his decision variable. The manufacturer’s expected profit is given by:
πManufacturer
DU3
(w
DU3
) = (w
DU3
− (c+ t))Q
DU3
(w
DU3
) (28)
By using the inverse ofQ
DU3
(wDU3) which is wDU3(QDU3) = (r−s) [1− Fm(QDU3)]+
s, the expected profit function of the manufacturer can be written as follows:
πManufacturer
DU3
(Q
DU3
) = { (r − s) [1− Fm(QDU3)]− (c− s+ t)} QDU3 (29)
The result of Larivie`re and Porteus (2001) can be invoked directly, as the fol-
lowing result shows:
Result 4. For Approach 3 under an IGFR condition on the random variable
Dm:
1. The optimal ordering quantity is such that:
1− Fm(Q
∗
DU3
)−Q∗
DU3
fm(Q
∗
DU3
) =
c− s+ t
r − s
2. The corresponding optimum wholesale price is:
w∗DU3 = c+ t+ (r − s)Q
∗
DU3fm(Q
∗
DU3)
3. The optimum expect profit of the manufacturer is:
πManufacturer
∗
DU3 = (r − s)(Q
∗
DU3
)2fm(Q
∗
DU3
)
4. The optimum expect profit of the retailer is:
πe−retailer
∗
DU3 = (r − s)
∫ Q∗
DU3
Dm=0
Dmfm(Dm)dDm
Proof. cf. Larivie`re and Porteus (2001) by considering c+t as a unit production
cost.
Remark 4. As expected, even if we assumed that the manufacturer pays the
tag price, he adjusts his wholesale price in order to include this additional cost.
This is why the notion of sharing the tag price is not relevant under a wholesale
contract. To eleaborate on this result, let’s consider two settings according to
which the manufacturer pays a fraction α1t (α2t) and the e-retailer pays the rest
(1− α1)t ((1− α2)t). Using the same analysis as before, we can easily show that
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[w∗DU3]α2 − [w
∗
DU3]α1 = (α2 − α1)t. As a consequence [Q
∗
DU3]α2 = [Q
∗
DU3]α1 which
assures that [πManufacturer
∗
DU3 ]α2 = [π
Manufacturer∗
DU3 ]α1 and [π
e−retailer∗
DU3 ]α2 = [π
e−retailer∗
DU3 ]α1 .
Approach 2 under the Decentralized Coordinated case: Errors are Ignored
As in Approach 1, here we also use a buy-back contract which is completely
determined by a 2-tuple (w
DC2
, b
DC2
), where w
DC2
and b
DC2
are the wholesale
price and the buy-back price, respectively.
The e-retailer’s Decision:. The expected profit function of the e-retailer is given
by:
πe−retailer
DC2
(Q
DC2
, w
DC2
, b
DC2
) = (r − w
DC2
)µ− (r − w
DC2
)
∫ +∞
x=Q
DC2
(x−Q
DC2
)f(x)dx
− (w
DC2
− b
DC2
)
∫ Q
DC2
x=0
(Q
DC2
− x)f(x)dx (30)
By assuming bDC2 < wDC2 < r, the retailer’s profit is strictly concave and the
optimal ordering quantity Q∗
DC2
satisfies
Q∗
DC2
(w
DC2
, b
DC2
) = F−1
[
r − w
DC2
r − b
DC2
]
(31)
The Manufacturer’s Decision:. The expected profit of the manufacturer is as
follows:
πManufacturer
DC2
(Q
DC2
, w
DC2
, b
DC2
) = (w
DC2
− c)Q
DC2
(w
DC2
, b
DC2
)
−(b
DC2
− s)
∫ Q
DC2
0
F (x)dx
The following result (from Pasternack (1985)) outlines the coordination condi-
tions of the buy-back contract under Approach 2:
Result 5. Suppose that the manufacturer offers a contract (w
DC2
(ε), b
DC2
(ε))
for ε ∈ (0, r − c) where w
DC2
(ε) = r − ε and b
DC2
(ε) = r − ε r−s
r−c
:
1. The e-retailer orders the optimal solution of the Centralized Scenario and
the system profit is also equal to the Centralized Scenario profits
2. The parameter ε governs the distribution of market power: a high ε implies
a strong retailer.
Proof. cf. Pasternack (1985).
• The expected Manufacturer profit is given by:
πManufacturer∗
DC2
= πManufacturer
DC2
(Q∗C2, w
∗
DC2, b
∗
DC2) (32)
• The expected e-retailer profit is given by
πe−retailer∗
DC2
= πe−retailer
DC1
(Q∗C2, w
∗
DC2, b
∗
DC2) (33)
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Approach 3 under the Decentralized Coordinated case: the RFID Enabled Ap-
proach
Similarly to previous analysis, under approach 3 we also assume a back
contract according to which the manufacturer offers to buy-back all unsold units
of the e-retailer at the price bDC3. We interpret the ’operation’ of the buy-back
contract such that the manufacturer pays (bDC3 − s) for each unsold unit, and
the e-retailer salvages the item for s. Also, we assume as previously that the
tag price is totally paid by the manufacturer.
The e-retailer’s Decision:. The expected profit function of the e-retailer is given
by:
πe−retailer
DC3
(Q
DC3
, w
DC3
, b
DC3
) = (r − w
DC3
)µ
− (r − w
DC3
)
∫ +∞
x=Q
DC3
(x−Q
DC3
)fm(x)dx
− (w
DC3
− b
DC3
)
∫ Q
DC3
x=0
(Q
DC3
− x)fm(x)dx
(34)
By assuming bDC3 < wDC3 < r, the e-retailer’s profit is strictly concave and
the optimal ordering quantity Q∗
DC3
satisfies:
Q∗
DC3
(w
DC3
, b
DC3
) = F−1m
[
r − w
DC3
r − b
DC3
]
(35)
The Manufacturer’s Decision:. The expected profit function of the manufac-
turer is like the one considered by Pasternack (1985) with the exception that
the unit production price is no longer c but c+ t:
πManufacturer
DC3
(Q
DC3
, w
DC3
, b
DC3
) = (w
DC3
− (c+ t))Q
DC3
(w
DC3
, b
DC3
)
− (b
DC3
− s)
∫ Q
DC3
0
Fm(x)dx (36)
The following result (from Pasternack (1985)) outlines the coordination condi-
tions of the buy back contract:
Result 6. Suppose that the manufacturer offers a contract (w
DC3
(ε), b
DC3
(ε))
for ε ∈ (0, r − c− t) where w
DC3
(ε) = r − ε and b
DC3
(ε) = r − ε r−s
r−(c+t) :
1. The e-retailer orders the optimal quantity of the Centralized Scenario and
the system profit is also equal to the Centralized Scenario profits
2. The e-retailer profit is increasing in ε. In particular
πe−retailer
∗
DC3 (wDC3(ε), bDC3(ε)) =
ε
r−(c+t)π
∗
C3
3. The manufacturer profit is decreasing in ε. In particular
πManufacturer
∗
DC3 (wDC3(ε), bDC3(ε)) = (1−
ε
r−(c+t) )π
∗
C3
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Proof. cf Pasternack (1985)
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